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Abstract
The aim of this proposal is to explore the use of evidentiality in Spanish trials and 
its relationship with the genre’s conventions and the roles of the participants in these 
discursive events. To do that, we base our study on a quantitative–qualitative analy-
sis of a transcribed corpus of oral Spanish trials. Evidentiality is a semantic-func-
tional category that includes linguistic devices that mark the source of information 
behind the speaker’s statements. The explicit marking of the source is not obliga-
tory in Spanish; however, in specific genres (legal, parliamentary, and academic), it 
becomes a powerful argumentative tool for negotiating the validity of the ideas. We 
analysed how different participants in the trials made use of evidential expressions. 
It can be observed that speakers with expert knowledge about the genre conventions 
(jurists) employed evidentiality differently from the way in which lay participants 
did. Some differences can be observed at the level of the types of evidentiality. For 
example, generic inferences and the reporting of laws and scripts are typical of the 
jurists’ discourse, while lay participants, particularly the witnesses, referred more 
often to information based on observation. Furthermore, our analysis suggested 
that jurists were more likely to exploit evidential constructions for argumentative or 
strategic purposes. For example, logical reasoning based on presumably known or 
shared information can be used to downgrade the speaker’s commitment or to miti-
gate and attenuate disagreement.
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Introduction
The purpose of this research is to study the ways in which evidentiality appears in 
a specific legal genre, namely trials. One of the main reasons that this particular 
genre is interesting for the study of evidentiality is that “[i]n law, fact is not found 
but reconstructed based on the admissible evidence” (Cheng and Cheng 2014). This 
statement leads to the following two ideas, among others.
First, the ‘facts’ mentioned in court may not be true, although all the participants 
attempt to present their facts and speech as being as credible as possible. Second, 
since the trials and the final decisions of the judges are based on the way in which 
facts are presented (among other considerations), some specialised devices for mak-
ing utterances admissible must exist.
One way to produce a convincing discourse is through the use of evidentiality. 
In this sense, signalling the source of the information and the way the speaker has 
accessed this source may contribute to increasing the reliability of the discourse. It is 
not quite the same a statement made using an evidential device, as can be observed 
in (1), or without it (1′)
(1)
D: en cualquier caso nosotros no tenemos la autoridad/ MÉDICA ni la autori-
dad CIENTÍFICA/ pero/ mm/ aun siendo así parece que el sentido común/ 
nos dice que es una situación/ EXTREMADAMENTE forzada que se pueda 
llegar a esa conclusión (SVB)1
D: in any case we do not have the MEDICAL/ authority nor the SCIENTIFIC 
authority / but / mm / even though it seems that the common sense / tells us 
that it is a situation / EXTREMELY forced to reach that conclusion
(1′)
D: en cualquier caso nosotros no tenemos la autoridad/ MÉDICA ni la autori-
dad CIENTÍFICA/ pero/ mm/ aun siendo así/ es una situación/ EXTREMAD-
AMENTE forzada que se pueda llegar a esa conclusión
D: in any case we do not have the MEDICAL/ authority nor the SCIENTIFIC 
authority / but / mm / even though it is a situation / EXTREMELY forced to 
reach that conclusion
While the first example (1), in which the source of information is signalled, presents 
the information as being reasonable (it is “common sense” that leads us to the con-
clusions presented), in the second case (1′), seems that the statement of the lawyer is 
biased by his own interests, and his utterance is, therefore, less credible.2
1 The examples are followed by the code of the trial from which the example was extracted. S stands for 
‘labour court’, C for ‘civil court’, CA for ‘administrative court’ and P for ‘criminal court’. V designates 
the place where the trial took place (Valencia) and A or B is an aleatory letter to identify the trial.
2 Credibility is the ability of being convincing or believable. In this work, we understand credibility as a 
matter of degree (see Seniuk 2013) that can be applied to the speech of any participant at court, that is to 
say that being credible can be as necessary and useful for (expert) witnesses as for lawyers at court. The 
credibility or reliability that triers of facts or an audience grants to a person can be modulated through 
language (Conley et al. 1978).
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In order to conduct this study, we have considered three research questions. The 
first is how evidentiality is manifested in trials? Second, what kind of differences 
can be observed in the use of evidentiality among people in law and lay partici-
pants in this particular genre in which professional and lay people interact? Finally, 
if these differences are observed, how can we explain them?
In the following sections, we will discuss the category of evidentiality in Spanish 
and its relationship to the discourse genre in which it appears. We will also describe 
the discursive traits of the trials, paying special attention to the role of participants 
in the Spanish courts. We will then explain the methods used in this study and will 
present the results of the analysis. Finally, we will provide conclusions based on our 
research.
Evidentiality and Discourse Genres
In evidential languages, evidentials are codified in grammar and their use is obliga-
tory (Anderson 1986; Aikhenvald 2004). However, in Spanish and other called 
‘non-evidential languages’, evidentiality can be described as a functional category 
(Hassler 2010; Albelda 2015, 2016; Izquierdo Alegría et al. 2016; Kotwica 2019). 
“According to this broad [functional] definition, evidentiality is a semantic domain 
that expresses the source of information through several linguistic mechanisms 
beyond the purely morphological level” (Albelda and Estellés 2018: 334).
The definition quoted above presupposes that evidential meanings can be 
expressed by a variety of language expressions and strategies (such as discourse 
markers, verbal constructions, specific tense uses and other elements of which the 
evidential functioning depends on the context in which they are used) (González 
Vázquez 2016). It is the context that activates the evidential meaning in many 
expressions, as stated clearly in the discursive definition of evidentiality in Spanish 
adopted by Cabedo Nebot and Figueras Bates (2018: 9):
[T]he functional category of evidentiality is brought to discourse by the 
deployment of a set of linguistic strategies that make explicit what counts 
as evidence in certain contexts and in certain textual genres, and what par-
ticular pragmatic meanings these mechanisms acquire, invoke and project onto 
the on-going discourse (Cabedo Nebot and Figueras Bates 2018: 9, emphasis 
added).
Although, as expressed above, the context is the key factor for recognising the mark-
ers of evidentiality in the discourse, there are several more objective parameters that 
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can be taken into account. More precisely, in order to consider an evidential use, the 
evidence must be available to the speaker (Anderson 1986: 274: “(e)videntials show 
the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making 
that claim”). This implies that the perception of the speaker (I saw that…) could be 
considered a trace of direct evidentiality, while the perception of others could not 
(My sister saw that…). Another useful parameter for recognising evidential uses is 
the presence of the realis context (Anderson 1986), which implies that a negated 
verb of perception would not be considered to be an evidential (I did not see that…). 
Finally, as Boye (2010) and Boye and Harder (2009) suggested, evidentials operate 
over a propositional scope.3 Moreover, it should be noted that a single language ele-
ment may express different types of evidential meanings, depending on the context, 
structure, as well as the strategies pursued by the speaker.4 This means that a sin-
gle element can be assigned different evidential meanings (Whitt 2010). In “Types 
of Evidentiality” section, we will revise the classification of evidential meanings as 
adopted in the present study.
The broad conception of evidentiality has still other interesting consequences 
related to the discursive behaviour of evidential elements:
This wide perspective on evidentiality also implies the existence of fuzzy 
boundaries with other neighbouring categories such as epistemicity, mirativity, 
and mitigation (…) and also contemplates a genre-related influence in the pos-
sibility of acquiring different pragmatic values, which supports the impact of 
genre in the behaviour of evidentials (Albelda and Estellés 2018: 334).
Multiple studies have proven that the genre is one of the crucial factors determining 
the way in which evidentiality is expressed and the pragmatic functions that it dis-
plays. As recent works prove (for example, Cabedo Nebot and Figueras Bates 2018; 
Albelda and Estellés 2018, this volume), the correlations between the expression of 
evidentiality and the discourse genre are multiple and multi-layered. The analysis of 
evidentiality conducted via a close understanding not only of the co-text but also of 
the cultural and discourse contexts allows for a better description of the function-
ing of this category. At the same time, studies of the use and functions of evidential 
marking in different genres help to obtain better insight in those genres and to pin-
point the strategies used to accomplish different pragmatic functions. As we will 
attempt to demonstrate, this is the case when analysing evidentiality in trials from 
Spanish courts.
Expression of Evidentiality in Trials
The resolution of a disagreement in the courtroom entails that the parties in conflict 
have presented the judge with opposing versions of the facts in the dispute. In this 
3 See Kotwica (2019) for a more detailed explanation of the parameters that help to identify evidential 
elements in Spanish.
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situation, the judge has to determine what can be understood as being true in order 
to provide a basis for his/her decision. The impossibility of knowing exactly what 
happened in the past means that, in law, the truth is understood as the existence of 
reasons to consider particular information to be true (Ruiz Monroy 2016). In other 
words, it can be perceived a greater or lesser approximation of the truth in relation to 
the context and the circumstances in question (Taruffo 2010: 99).
Since the construction of the truth is accomplished mainly via what is stated in 
court, it seems logical to think that those mechanisms that help to present the infor-
mation as objective or as reasonable as possible will be of great value for the partici-
pants. This is why the use of evidentiality is necessary and argumentatively relevant 
in this genre.
As stated previously, the main goal of a trial is to resolve a dispute. However, as 
many participants are included in this process and each of them performs a specific 
role, it is necessary to reflect on the functions of each role in order to understand 
their particular goals more appropriately. Our hypothesis in this work is that the dif-
ferent roles involve different uses of evidentiality.
The participants in a trial can be classified according to their knowledge of the 
law and their discursive rights in the courtroom. Accordingly, we can distinguish 
between professional and lay participants (Briz 2011; Villalba 2017). Among the 
professional participants, we can find judges, court clerks, court agents, party agents 
and lawyers. With regard to lay participants, we consider the defendants, plaintiffs, 
witnesses and expert witnesses.
The judge, who is the highest authority in the courtroom, has the function of mod-
erating and gathering as much information as possible to issue a fair judgement.5
Lawyers for both parties6 share the same goal in court, which is to persuade the 
judge to make a judgement based on their claims. Despite this, some differences can 
be identified in this group of professionals. On one hand, the lawyers for the active 
party represent the interests of the person who raises a claim in a dispute.7 During 
the trial, they will rely on the presentation of evidence and their reasons that make 
their version of the facts convincing. On the other hand, lawyers for the passive 
party will attempt to refute the arguments of the counterpart and present evidence 
and testimonies to support their own claims.
It is possible to identify a group of professional participants who, during the 
course of the trial, adopt a passive role; that is, they appear as assistants to facilitate 
the development of the process, but do not intervene to a significant degree. Within 
this group are the court clerk, the party agent and the court agent.
The court clerk records the trial and writes the minutes including the relevant 
data. During the process, the court clerk has right to interrupt if s/he needs addi-
tional information to perform his/her duty.
5 See the Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2007).
6 We insert the figure of the prosecutor here, as s/he represents the interests of the victim in contrast to 
those of the defendant.
7 In criminal court, the interests of the plaintiff are represented by the prosecutor, who intervenes auto-
matically and, if wanted, a private prosecutor as well.
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The party agent acts as a representative of the parties in the process. This is a par-
ticipant whose presence is not always mandatory during the hearing.8 In our corpus, 
this figure appears only rarely, which is why we will not take this figure into account 
during our analysis.
Finally, the court agent is an assistant whose function is to assist in the course of 
the trial by bringing the witnesses into the courtroom and facilitating the procedures 
that are performed in the courtroom.
Among the lay participants, the terminology used to refer to the parties involved 
in the process depends on the jurisdiction9 and, as analysts, some limitations need 
to be addressed. In Spanish legal system (which is attached to Continental Law) a 
citizen or entity can take legal action against another person or entity through any 
jurisdiction. This is a big difference from the Common Law’s system, where it 
is the State that files legal action in criminal court. The idiosyncrasy of the sys-
tems belonging to the Continental Law and Common Law means that there is not 
enough terminology in English to refer to the Spanish legal reality. Therefore, we 
have chosen to use ‘plaintiff’ to refer to the person who decides to initiate the trial 
and ‘defendant’ for the person against whom legal action has been taken in every 
jurisdiction.
The defendant is the person who has allegedly performed the act due to which the 
judicial process has been initiated. Since s/he has representation, his/her role in the 
trial is passive; that is, s/he observes the progression of the trial and only intervenes 
when asked to clarify certain points.
The plaintiff is the person who has initiated the legal process. His/her role in the 
room is to intervene during the examination and cross-examination, if requested.
In trials in which an expert report has been required, the figure of the expert wit-
ness is involved. Expert witnesses are professionals in different fields (medicine, 
psychology, linguistics and so on) who write a report on some aspect that can pro-
vide more information about the facts that are being judged. Their participation 
focuses on ratifying their reports and answering any questions the lawyers or the 
judge may have about them.
Finally, the witnesses are those people who offer their testimony for the benefit 
or detriment of the defendant. Unlike the persons indicated, witnesses have an obli-
gation to tell the truth because, if they do not do so, they could commit the crime 
of false testimony. Their function is to answer the questions that the lawyers or the 
judge want to ask.
9 Spanish legal system has four jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction focuses on different matters: criminal 
jurisdiction encompasses actions present in the Criminal Code, administrative jurisdiction regulates the 
activity of Public Administration, labour jurisdiction focuses on the management of the conflict between 
employers and employees and civil jurisdiction takes care of all the cases that are not addressed in the 
previous jurisdictions. Furthermore, the way process is constructed and its participants is different from 
one jurisdiction to another.
8 In accordance with Law 1/2000 of January 7 of Civil Procedure, the figure of the party agent is not 
necessary when the characteristics indicated in Article 23 are met. Similarly, in labour court, the pres-
ence of this professional is not mandatory.
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Every role is constrained by the rights and obligations governed by the genre, 
as well as the rigidly fixed discursive goals they aim to achieve. Thus, knowledge 
of these discursive patterns can provide a better understanding of the evidential 
resources that could be expected according to each role, and to theorise about the 
possibility that evidentiality can develop other pragmatic functions in this particular 
context, such as attenuation or intensification.
Corpus and Methods
In order to carry out our study, we followed a quantitative and qualitative methodol-
ogy based on the study of the Corpus Val. Es. Co. of Oral Legal Discourse (unpub-
lished). We selected two Spanish trials from each subject-related jurisdiction present 
in the Spanish legal system, namely civil, criminal, labour and administrative sys-
tems. In total, our corpus contained eight trials and 49,227 words, but after refining 
the data, for this study we worked with 41,715.10
As we have explained, it seems that evidentiality is embedded deeply in the cul-
tural and contextual traits of the discourse genre “trial”, specifically to the differ-
ent roles that are performed by the participants in this discursive event. Considering 
this, we have based this research on the analysis on two main variables, namely the 
type of evidentiality and the roles of the participants.
Types of Evidentiality
Considering the well-known classification proposed by Willett (1988), we distin-
guished between direct and indirect types of evidence. The domain of direct eviden-
tiality includes different types of perception. For example, with visual evidential-
ity, the speaker accesses evidence via visual perception. This type of evidentiality is 
usually expressed by specific constructions of verbs of perception (Whitt 2010). In 
Spanish, Bermúdez (2005) and Estrada (2009), among others, pointed out evidential 
uses of the verb ver (‘to see’).
Within the domain of indirect evidence, there are two major types: inferences and 
reportatives (Willett 1988). Inferences, according to Plungian (2010), pertain to the 
particular domain of the “indirect/personal” type. As Bermúdez (2005: 13) pointed 
out, prototypical inferences are those that are based on a personal source and entail 
cognitive access to the information; however, this author presumed that there was 
a continuum ranging from purely sensorial to purely cognitive sources of informa-
tion (Bermúdez 2005: 10). Inferences appear as an intermediate category between 
the direct and the indirect types of evidence in the classification by De Haan (2001: 
196), who described them as the only evidential type that was simultaneously time 
direct and not first-hand. The special nature of inferences was also addressed by 
10 We have selected only interventions of the participants that interest us for this study (see “Roles of 
Participants” section). In addition, tags with contextual information have been removed and those words 
divided by overlaps have been quantified as one word manually.
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Squartini (2008). This author proposed that, in order to account for the different 
types of information on which an inference can be built, one must consider infer-
ences in terms of a gradient in which three main points are distinguished, namely 
circumstantial inferences, generic inferences and conjectures. All of these are based 
on the inferential processes, but some distinctions can be made:
However, the three are differentiated along a parameter that is connected to 
the balance between the speaker’s involvement as opposed to the import of 
external evidence. While in one of the two poles (circumstantial inferences), 
the speaker’s own reasoning is heavily supplemented by external sensory evi-
dence, in the opposite pole, all external evidence is missing, the speaker being 
solely responsible for the reasoning process. In between, the intermediate area 
of generic inferences can be found with a balanced proportion of the speaker’s 
own reasoning and external information deriving from general world knowl-
edge (Squartini 2008: 925).
Based on the above quotation, in order to distinguish between the three types of 
inferences, one should focus on the proportion of the speaker’s reasoning involved 
versus presence of evidences from the external world.
Finally, in the case of the reported evidentiality, the information originates from 
an external source (second-hand, third-hand or folklore, in the classification by Wil-
lett 1988), which means that the speaker acquires the information from the discourse 
of others. Special note should be taken of the direct reported discourse as a case of 
evidential marking. Direct reported discourse is extremely common in oral Spanish. 
As Estellés (2015) proved for the case of colloquial Spanish, direct reported speech 
is often inserted into the discourse without any specific introductory elements that 
could be categorised as evidential markers (for example, verbs of communication). 
However, Estellés (2015) showed that when such explicit markers do not appear, it is 
the specific prosodic configuration that functions as evidential mechanism.11
In sum, in this research we took into account the following types of evidential 
meanings: direct sensorial evidentiality (for example, evidences from the vision), 
inferences (circumstantial, generic, conjecture) and reportatives.
Roles of Participants
In addition to the identification of types of evidentiality, our analysis also takes into 
account the role of the speaker who uses the evidential mechanism. It has already 
been explained that we postulate the hypothesis that genre influences the way in 
which evidentiality manifests in discourse.
11 Quoting Estellés (2015): “The fact that marked prosody appears whenever a linguistic mark is lacking, 
but not vice versa, points to the important role that prosody might play as an indicator of DRD when no 
other linguistic marks signal the presence of reported discourse. In such circumstances, it stops being just 
redundant or concomitant, and becomes prominent and non-optional. Consequently, prosodic marked-
ness could be regarded as an evidential mechanism”.
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In our analysis, we have distinguished between professional and lay participants. 
Among the professional participants, the figures of the judge, lawyers and prosecu-
tor have been taken into account. The court clerk, the court agent, or the party agent 
have not been considered because their contribution during the hearings is scarce, 
as their oral participation is limited. With regard to the lay participants, we have 
worked with the statements made by defendants, plaintiffs, witnesses and expert 
witnesses.
The first part of the qualitative analysis of the aforementioned variables was con-
ducted manually because a close analysis of each context was necessary to judge the 
type of evidential meaning expressed. In the second phase of the study, we trans-
formed the results into nominal variables and conducted a simple statistical analysis 
in order to investigate whether any interesting associations existed.
General Results
We analysed 326 linguistic elements as occurrences of evidentiality or evidential 
markers, which is 7.81 evidential markers per every 1000 words. Table 1 shows the 
frequencies of each type.
According to our results, the presence of reportative evidentiality was the most 
prominent in the entire corpus (64.1%). This was due to the format of the trials 
in which testimonials and legal documents were quoted literally or referred to on 
numerous occasions. The second most frequent type of evidentiality was generic 
inference (25.2%); that is, an inference based on the previous knowledge of the 
speaker, general information and/or logical reasoning. The other two types of infer-
ences did not appear frequently in the corpus. Conjecture appeared in 4% of the 
cases, and circumstantial inference only appeared in 1.5% of them. We found visual 
evidentiality in 5.2% of the examples. In the following paragraphs, we will show 
some examples of how each evidential type was expressed in the corpus.
Evidentiality in the Corpus of Trials
All instances of direct visual evidentiality in the corpus were expressed via verbs of 
perception, mainly ver (‘to see’); there was also one case of apreciar (‘to perceive’). 
Table 1  Frequencies of 
evidential types in the corpus
a Visual evidentiality was the only type of direct evidentiality 
observed in the corpus
Frequency Percentage
Reported evidentiality 209 64.1
Generic inference 82 25.2
Visual  evidentialitya 17 5.2
Conjecture 13 4
Circumstantial inference 5 1.5
Total 326 100
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The following example (2) is the most prototypical context in which the speaker 
describes what he/she saw personally.
(2) T2: pues les he venido a contar que salí de casa↑/ yy vi que había mucho 
follón en la calle↑ (PVB)
T2: so I came to tell you that I left the house / aand I saw that there was much 
racket in the street
The linguistic element that transmits evidentiality here is the verb ver (‘to see’) and 
the verb is conjugated in the first person singular, signalling that the evidence was 
accessed by the speaker him- or herself and no one else. In this particular case, the 
speaker relates what s/he saw when s/he left the house and entered the street. It is 
interesting to observe that the speaker appears in the role of a witness during the 
trial, and s/he stresses explicitly that s/he came to the court to describe what s/he 
observed that may be related to the case (les he venido a contar que…).
Apart from first person uses of verbs of perception, we also found examples of 
plural forms. The following example illustrates the use of the first person plural 
(vemos, ‘we see’).
(3) T3: bueno pues eel servicio comienza cuando vamos patrullando por la 
avenida Conde Ludovico// a la altura del cruce con la calle Manantiales/ eeh 
vemos al caballero cruzando conn- con un PERRO↑ entendemos que es de 
raza peligrosa/// (PVB)
T3: so well thee service starts when we are patrolling the Conde Lodovico 
Avenue // at the junction with Manantiales street / eeh we see the gentleman 
crossing with- with a DOG we understand that it is of dangerous breed ///
In example (3), there is a report of another witness, a police officer, who describes 
what he and his colleague saw while patrolling the streets. The evidential expres-
sion here is again the verb ‘to see’ in the plural form (vemos). The witness suggests 
that two people perceived the same thing at the same time (which could be accept-
able when we consider that two officers were patrolling together) and, even more 
intriguing, that they both came to the same conclusion about the perceived scene. 
The conclusion part is expressed in the clause entendemos que es de raza peligrosa. 
This section of the information is still based on what the speaker saw; however, a 
deeper cognitive processing is suggested here, which means that it is a case of cir-
cumstantial inference in which the speaker relies on some direct experience in order 
to formulate a conclusion.
In example (4), we show another case of circumstantial inference; nevertheless, 
some previous background is necessary to explain it. What occurs in the example is 
that speaker D (the defendant’s lawyer) affirms that the plaintiff was laughing while 
the defendant was making his declaration. The lawyer makes this statement in order 
to cast doubt on the credibility to the plaintiff’s declaration. However, this affirma-
tion causes the judge to interrupt the lawyer—the judge wants to make it clear that 
she did not appreciate any inappropriate laughter and thinks that the behaviour of 
the plaintiff was due to some tics he has. After the judge’s intervention, the defence 
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lawyer explains that it was not her intention to offend, but rather to express the 
impression or the sensation she had. We quote an example below:
(4) D: (…) no debió ser/ ni tan tremenda ni tan peligrosa ni desde luego tan/ 
HUMILLANTE o tan atentatoria contra/ eeh su persona el hecho de que se 
haya estado riéndose durante toda su declaración/ lo cierto es quee/ [en →]
J:                                   [siento inte]rrumpirle sie- por- per- esto nn- yo no lo he 
apreciao/ creo que es un tic y una forma de hablar del agente/ [¿eh?]
D:                                          [bueno dis]culpe eesta es mi impresión/ si es/ lo 
contrario no lo [hago con ánimo de ofender]
J:              [es que si se- si se hubie]se estado riendo le habría llamado la aten-
ción evidentemente (…) no / me parece que no
D: le digo que esto no es a- con ánimo de ofender sino con ánimo de apre-
ciación que me ha dado la sensación12 (PVB)
D: (…) it couldn’t have been / neither so tremendous nor so dangerous nor of 
course so / HUMBLING or so threatening against / eeh himself the fact that he 
has been laughing during all his statement / the truth is that / [in →]
J:                                   [I’m sorry to interrupt you], because- this- I have not 
appreciated it / I think it’s a tic and the agent’s way of speaking / [you know?]
D:                                               [well sorry]y this is my impression / if it is / 
the opposite I don’t do it [with the intention of offending]
J:                   [the thing is that if he had] been laughing, he would have called 
attention obviously (…) / it doesn’t seem so no
D: I´m telling you that this is not a- with the intention of offending but with 
the intention of appreciation that I had the sensation
The parts of speaker D’s speech in which she refers to her own appreciations and 
sensations are meant to express a circumstantial inference that this speaker has made 
based on what she heard in court in the declaration of the plaintiff whom she accuses 
(although without meaning to offend) of laughing inappropriately during her cli-
ent’s declaration. The laughter is certainly something that can be perceived and, as 
the judge states, everyone would have heard it, herself included. At this point, D has 
no other option but to resort to an inference that allows her to add some personal 
interpretation to the reality. Clearly, she cannot attempt to affirm that she had purely 
sensory evidence of the laughter having taken place (other people would have heard it 
too); therefore, she uses the inference to downgrade the affirmation. She did not hear 
the laughter per se, but what she heard made her think that the plaintiff was laughing.
The second type of inferences, generic inferences, were the most frequent in the 
corpus (82 occurrences). These examples are mainly cases of reasoning based on log-
ical argumentation (5), arguments and data stemming from the legal documentation 
(6) or a combination of both types of information and the speaker’s general knowl-
edge about the world (which is sometimes also specialised) (7).
12 The transcription of some examples has been simplified for clarity (e.g. we have deleted some tran-
scription marks related to prosody and pauses that are not relevant for this research).
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(5) D: ¿se pusieron en paralelo?
T2: sí sí
D: ocupando dos carriles/ claro/ obviamente (PVA)
D: they drove in parallel?
T2: yes yes
D: occupying two lanes / of course / obviously
(6) D: (…) pero vamos ello evidentemente↓ en base al artículo veinte justi-
fica que no se apliquen intereses moratorios↓ (PVA)
D: (…) but well this evidently ↓ based on article twenty justifies that morato-
rium interests are not applied ↓
(7)  J: (…) es evidente que no existee eh doblee castigo y así se pronunció el 
Tribunal Constitucional en una sentencia (…) (PVA)
J: (…) it is evident that the double punishment doesn’t exist and that is how 
the Constitutional Court pronounced in a judgement (…)
Because of the nature of the arguments involved in the formation of the inference, the 
speakers often imply that the reasoning is of a universal nature; that is, that the conclu-
sions he or she has drawn are the logical, obvious conclusions that anyone would draw 
given the same set or arguments. This is frequently implied by the form of the eviden-
tial used, for example: entendemos, evidentemente, lógicamente, es evidente, parece 
ser que (‘we understand, evidently, logically, it’s evident, it seems that’). All of these 
resources reinforce the idea of a more general, shared reasoning that is not restricted to 
the realm of the speaker’s subjectivity. The use of shared, accessible (Bermúdez 2005) 
or intersubjective (Nuyts 2001) evidence, along with the role that the speakers who 
use them play in the trial, have interesting pragmatic consequences, as we will show in 
“Evidentiality and Role of Participants: The Influence of the Genre” section.
The third type of inference, conjecture, represents the speaker’s most personal 
and subjective judgements, personal beliefs and hypotheses. These are not particu-
larly frequent in the corpus; however, we can see some examples in which conjec-
tures can be expressed; for example, using future and conditional tense forms.
(8) D: Señoría yo no he negado el documentoo eh vamos/ lo digo por el repre-
sentante legal supongo que será paraa la factura (CVB)
D: Your Honour, I have not denied the document hmm well / I say it because 
of the legal representative I suppose it would be for the invoice
As in example (8) above, when a conjecture is made, it is impossible to recognise the 
actual arguments on which the speaker bases the formulation of his or her hypoth-
esis; the speaker appears to be guessing or relying on personal ideas and intuition, 
not on any observable facts or logical arguments.
A significant amount of information that appeared during the trials in our corpus 
data was based on reported information. The main type of reports that appear in this 
genre are quotes and references to legal documentation (legal articles, witness and 
forensic reports, court sentences and the like). We present some excerpts in which 
reported evidence is signalled in the examples below:
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(9) A: (…) así se ha manifestado/ entre otras sentencias el Tribunal Supremo 
(…) (SVB)
A: (…) this has been shown / among other judgements of the Supreme Court 
(…)
(10) J: (…) de acuerdo con la ley (…) (PVA)
J: (…) according to the law (…)
(11) F: (…) el Tribunal Superior viene estableciendo que (…) (PVB)
F: (…) the Superior Court establishes that (…)
(12) A: (…) el forense señala y manifiesta que (…) (SVA)
A: (…) the forensic expert states and manifests that (…)
Apart from the examples such as (9–12), instances of direct reported discourse 
appeared frequently in the corpus, with or without explicit marking (e.g. verba 
dicendi). Such cases also compute to the overall number of cases of reported eviden-
tiality in the corpus.
Roles of Participants
The results presented in “Evidentiality in the Corpus of Trials” section show that the 
presence of markers of evidentiality in the discourse of the participants in the trials 
varied (Table 2).
Based on these results, a first observation is that there is a contrast in the quantity 
of evidential resources used by different participants in the trial. Within the profes-
sional roles, judges use a smaller number of evidential devices than do lawyers, who 
constitute a significant proportion of the cases of evidentiality analysed. This can be 
explained because the judge, who acts as a moderator, rarely intervenes in the pro-
cess (they are present in all trials and, despite that, concentrate 13.90% of the words 
in the corpus). Thus, the construction of the discourse relies on the lawyers and the 
non-professional participants who will present their testimonies.
It is noteworthy that, in the lawyers’ speeches, where the number of words stated 
by each role is similar, the presence of evidentiality is visibly higher in the case of 
the lawyers of the passive party compared to the lawyers of the active party. This 
contrast has also been documented in other research on the study of attenuation 
in trials (Villalba 2017). As in our case, attenuation devices were found more fre-
quently in the discourse of the passive party than they were in the discourse of the 
counterpart.
This difference can be explained if we think that elaborating the argumentation 
seems more demanding in the case of the passive party than in the case of the active 
party. In other words, the refutation of the arguments of the active party and the 
construction of a defence require an extra effort that can be traced linguistically in 
the greater presence of discursive mechanisms oriented towards satisfying the role’s 
goal; in our case, these discursive mechanisms are evidential devices.
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Something similar happens when we pay attention to the non-professional partici-
pants and, more precisely, to the people represented by the lawyers for the passive 
and the active party: the defendant and the plaintiff. According to our data, the pres-
ence of evidentiality in defendants’ discourse is higher than in plaintiffs’ discourse. 
This can also be linked to the fact that what is stated by the defendants is generally 
more challenged, and they have to convince the participants (mostly the judge) that 
their version of facts is true. Consequently, evidential devices are more profusely 
present in their discourse.
Finally, the participation of (expert) witnesses is limited to reporting that which 
could assist in reconstructing and understanding the facts in the most accurate way. 
Nevertheless, the way their discourse is constructed is different. While the witnesses 
have to show the certainty of what they say and to do this they frequently refer to 
how they have obtained the information, experts, as specialists in a field, are recog-
nized with certain authority in the matter. As a consequence, the use of evidentials 
becomes somehow less necessary in comparison.
Evidentiality and Role of Participants: The Influence of the Genre
In addition to observing the presence and frequency of evidential markers in the 
discourse of the speakers representing different roles in court, we analysed the types 
of evidentiality each of them used. According to the statistical analysis of the data, 
there seems to be a significant relationship (Chi square p = 0.00) between the role of 
the speaker and the preference for certain types of evidentiality. More specifically, 
there seem to be associations between the role of the lay participant (particularly 
witnesses) and visual evidentiality. Generic inference, on the other hand, is associ-
ated with the role of the lawyer. We will now look closer at each evidential type and 
its relationship with the speaker’s role. Special attention will be paid to visual evi-
dence and generic inferences.
It is not surprising that visual evidence is related to lay participants and, in par-
ticular, to witnesses. Lawyers invite their clients and witnesses to court to recount 
what they witnessed and then use their testimonies to support their version of the 
facts. In contrast to the statements by defendants and plaintiffs, who have an inter-
est in the resolution of the conflict, the testimony of the witnesses is expected to be 
more objective.
At the beginning of the examination phase, the judge asks witnesses if they have 
any interest in the judgement and makes them promise or swear that they will tell 
the truth. The witnesses are informed that, should they lie in court, this would be 
considered a crime of false testimony and legal action could be taken against them. 
This caution prior to the examination seems to constrain the speech of the witnesses. 
They need to use linguistic strategies that can help to ensure the accuracy of what is 
said, particularly when his/her discourse is challenged, as occurs during the cross-
examination. Let us show how this is encoded linguistically in example (13):
(13) T4: mi compañero se tuvo que subir a la reja para evitar que este señor lo 
atropellara
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D: eso es lo que le dijo su compañero/ ¿no?
T4: es que yo vi al- mi compañero en una reja/ y el coche debajo↓ o sea no 
creo que mi compañero se subiera a la reja porque sí → (PVA)
T4: my partner had to climb the fence to prevent this man from driving over 
him
D: that’s what your partner said / right?
T4: the thing is I saw my partner on a fence / and the car below↓ I mean I 
don’t think that my partner would have climbed the fence for no reason→
In example (13) above, the lawyer for the passive party (D) tries to confirm that 
the version the witness (T4) presents comes from a second-hand source (that’s what 
your partner said/right?). However, T4 corrects him and stresses that his statements 
are based on what he observed (the thing is I saw). By doing so, he attempts to 
verify what he is saying is true.
With regard to generic inferences, our data show these are correlated strongly 
with lawyers. This type of evidentiality is frequently based on general knowledge 
and logical arguments. Even if this is not the case, the speaker can use specific lin-
guistic resources to show that evidence is universal or shared by himself and others 
(including other participants in the event). In this sense, evidential expressions are 
more than just markers showing the origin of the information, as they can be used 
strategically.
Lawyers’ speech is mainly argumentative, as their goal in court is to persuade the 
judge to pass a judgement favourable to the interests of the person or entity that they 
represent. Accordingly, generic inferences at court will be used frequently to serve 
this goal.
In Spanish, the use of evidential elements has been associated with different prag-
matic strategies due to the non-obligatory character of evidentiality in this language 
(Albelda 2016: 80). When using evidential elements, the speaker’s decision may be 
highly strategic, since no language rule dictates the use of evidentials in Spanish. 
This means that the speaker is free to either omit any evidential marking or to use 
the type of evidential element he/she considers the most suitable according to the 
situation. Some generic inferences can be pragmatically neutral and simply serve to 
introduce the mode of knowing and/or the source of information (Albelda 2016: 95). 
This can be seen in example (14)
(14) D: sin embargo parece ser que era un aparato bastante grandee↑/ eeh 
diferente a una/ pistola eléctrica / un táser (PVB)
D: however it seems that it was a quite laarge device↑ / eeh different to a / stun 
gun / a Taser
The defendant and the lawyer for the passive party in example (14) claim that the 
plaintiff menaced the defendant with a Taser. After the plaintiff’s testimony, all the 
participants realised that the object the claimant had was not a Taser. Thus, the use 
of the evidential parece ser (‘it seems’) is just a linguistic device to signal that this 
information was revealed to the defence lawyer during the hearing.
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In contrast to this neutral use, other generic inferences may have different prag-
matic functions in the discourse. This can be observed in example (15). The plain-
tiff’s lawyer is attacking the expert’s report presented by the lawyer for the passive 
party and, to do so, he uses the verb entendemos (‘we understand’).
(15) A: fija el quince de junio/ de forma GRATUITA/ de forma eeh absolu-
tamente eeh yy sin apoyo sin apoyo documenTAL de ningún tipo↑/ y por lo 
tanto entendemos que este informe no es serio y desde luego no puede↑ en 
modo alguno combatir el contenido del informe de sanidad el médico forense 
(CVA)
A: determines June fifteen/ ARBITRARILY/ absolutely eeh and without sup-
port without documenTARY support of any kind ↑ / and therefore we under-
stand that this report is not serious and certainly cannot ↑ in any way combat 
the content of the health report of the forensic doctor
In the legal framework, as in academia, arguments tend to be accepted more easily 
when they are presented in a more objective manner (Livnat 2010). One way to achieve 
objectivity is through defocusing the agent that develops the action. Therefore, the con-
cealment of the speaker by using the plural voice (entendemos/we understand) contrib-
utes to creating a distance between the speaker and his/her own words (Villalba 2018).
In brief, in the example above, the lawyer uses an attenuation mechanism, linguistic 
impersonality or defocalisation of the deictic-personal point of reference (Caffi 2007), 
to satisfy a communicative goal strategically; in other words, to be more persuasive. At 
the same time, using a logic verb, the speaker shows that what has been stated cannot 
be reduced to a personal inference. As the faculty of understanding and logical reason-
ing is (generally) shared by all humans, everybody should make the same inference as 
the speaker. Consequently, the presence of the speaker is mitigated to make the state-
ment more objective, but the assertion is boosted, as the inference is presented as a 
logical conclusion accessible to everybody. This combination of attenuation–intensifi-
cation has been signalled as a somewhat predictable phenomenon when evidentiality is 
used strategically, and particularly in uses of indirect evidentiality (Estrada 2008; Briz 
2016; Albelda 2016).
In the case of circumstantial inference, the examples are very rare (only five occur-
rences), and we could not assign them specifically to one group of speakers. However, 
considering other types of evidence that were more frequent in the corpus, it could be 
concluded that circumstantial inference is not a suitable type of evidence for this genre. 
Firstly, lay participants are only supposed to talk about their direct experiences; there-
fore, the cognitive filter that inference adds is not suitable. Secondly, expert witnesses 
and jurists base their arguments on legal documentation, logical reasoning and quotes 
from others, which again leaves circumstantial inferences out of their discourse.
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the case of conjectures, which do not seem 
to be an appropriate type of evidence, neither in the case of the professionals nor lay 
participants. In the corpus, we found examples in which this type of highly personal or 
subjective reasoning was rejected explicitly:
(16) T1: consigue recogerme en la calle Ancha↑/ sí/ estamos hablando de TRA-
MOS rectos y de casco urbano/ ya está
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D: hombre/ me parece un poco difícil↑ [((       ))]
J:         [((deje)) sus] opiniones personales a un lado para
la fase de informes/ si puede ser/ las ha[ce de un=]
D:              [muy bien]
J: = modo jurídico/ y le hace preguntas sobre lo que vio y lo que oyó y no 
entre en la conversación con un TESTIGO/ adelante↓ por favor (PVA)
T1: got to me to pick me up in the Ancha street↑ / yes / we are talking about 
straight STREETS of the urban area / it is
D: man / I find it a bit difficult ↑ [((       ))]
J:                       [((leave)) your =] personal opinions set aside for thereport-
ing phase / if possible / make [them of =]
D:                       [very well]
J: = legal mode / and ask him questions about what he saw and what he heard 
and do not start a conversation with a WITNESS / continue↓ please
In example (16), the lawyer for the passive party offers his opinion, which does 
not seem to be based on any type of argument other than his own suppositions and 
conjectures (“it seems a bit difficult to me”). This is rejected overtly by the judge, 
who states that personal opinions should not appear in this phase of the trial.
Similarly, in example (17) below, the witness tries to offer conjectures and 
suppositions about what happened at the scene of accident, which prompts the 
judge to reprimand him:
(17) A: el contendor se salió de su sitio por culpa del viento porque estaba 
suelto o por por→
T2: ¡pues sería un cúmulo de circunstancias! supongo que sería →// una de 
las cosas fue el viento porque ese día hizo MUUCHO viento que hubo muchos 
servicios relacionados con el viento↑ pero también tiene suu debería tener suu 
sistemas de retención (…) noo funcionarían o noo / no estarían colocados
J: un un segundito por favor/ de todas maneras lo que le voy a agradecer 
es que conteste lo que sepa (DIRIGIÉNDOSE A T2) ¿mh? no lo que 
suponga↓ si llega a alguna suposición↑ (CVB)
A: the container moved because of the wind because it was loose or because 
of →
T2: it would have been be a pile of circumstances then! I suppose it would 
have been → // one of the things was the wind because that day it was VERY 
windy there were many services related to the wind↑ but it also has its it 
should have some retention systems (…) they would not have worked or they 
would not have been placed
J: just a second please / anyway what I’d appreciate is if you told what you 
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In example (17), the judge’s reaction to the witness’s reconstruction of what had 
occurred (based on conjecture) was to ask him to keep to the facts he knows and to 
refrain from guessing (“what I’d appreciate is if you told what you know mh? not 
what you suppose”). These examples support what the data have shown, namely that 
some types of evidentiality are reserved for each role according to the rights and 
obligations during the trial.
With regard to the reported evidentiality, it is present in the speech of all par-
ticipants; however, we observed interesting differences related to the type of sources 
that were quoted. On one hand, the specialists recalled documentation, laws and pre-
viously recorded court statements, and the reported information was used as an ele-
ment in the argument. On the other hand, in the reports of lay participants we found 
mentions of what they had heard from others, such as people present where the facts 
on dispute happened, and this information was used to reconstruct the scene. There-
fore, there is a qualitative difference regarding the type of indirect source quoted by 
the participants according to their roles in court and the goals they pursue.
Conclusions
In this paper, we focused on how the category of evidentiality is expressed in Spanish 
trials. The results of our analysis showed that, even though linguistic mechanisms for 
expressing all types of evidential meanings could be found, the most common types 
of evidentiality in this genre were reported evidentiality and generic inference. We 
also found interesting associations between the type of evidentiality and the role of 
the speaker in the trial. More specifically, visual evidence was typically presented 
by the lay participants (for example, the witnesses), while generic inferences were 
found predominantly in the discourse of specialists, such as lawyers. These results 
are related directly to the role that these categories of speakers are expected to play 
during a trial. Witnesses are expected to describe what they know about the circum-
stances of the dispute and what they experienced directly. Lawyers base their dis-
course on different types of arguments and types of reasoning that help them to dem-
onstrate their points and defend their position. These results led us to draw two main 
conclusions. Firstly, this analysis proved that the relationship between the expression 
of evidentiality and the genre of a trial in Spanish is a strong one; that is to say, the 
genre conventions (particularly those related to the roles of the participants in the 
trial) constrain the types of evidentiality that are used and the purposes for which 
they are used. Secondly, and bearing in mind the pragmatic functions derived from 
the use of some generic inferences in the discourse of lawyers, it seems that those 
who know the ‘rules’ or the genre conventions best are most likely to exploit them for 
the benefit of their own arguments. Exactly how this is accomplished and the extent 
to which generic inferences in the discourse of the lawyers lead to the mitigation and/
or strengthening of their arguments will be addressed in further research.
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